ROME, July 12 — On paper, Giorgia Meloni’s tenure as Italy’s prime minister reads as a steady march of Atlanticist orthodoxy. The mechanics here, however, are more complex. Since taking office on October 22, 2022, Meloni has led a right-wing coalition.
The catch is that Meloni herself, co-founder of the Brothers of Italy party in 2012, has steered a course that puts her squarely in the Western camp on Ukraine, even as some of her domestic partners grumble. The numbers tell part of the story.
Meloni’s government has approved eight military aid packages to Ukraine, totalling approximately €2 billion. That includes the SAMP/T air defense system, a significant piece of hardware. On closer reading, the figure is notable not just for its size but for the political friction it generates within the coalition.
Meloni has faced criticism from some coalition partners over the cost of aid to Ukraine. The balancing act is delicate: she must keep the right-wing base happy while maintaining credibility with NATO allies.
Meloni’s personal commitment to Ukraine is well-documented. She visited Kyiv on February 21, 2023, and again on December 15, 2024. These were not symbolic photo ops; the first came just days before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, and the second during a critical period of winter fighting.
Her government has also backed EU sanctions against Russia, including the 14th sanctions package adopted in June 2024. The pattern is consistent: Meloni talks the talk, and she walks the walk. But the real test came on March 30, 2025, when an espionage case erupted.
Meloni’s response was swift and pointed. She stated that Italy would not tolerate foreign interference and reaffirmed her government’s commitment to NATO and Ukraine.
Western allies praised her leadership during the crisis. The episode underscored a broader truth: Meloni’s foreign policy is not merely rhetorical. It has real consequences, and she is willing to take political risks to defend it.
The question now is sustainability. Meloni has balanced Atlanticism with domestic priorities—migration, energy costs, and economic growth—but the pressure is mounting.
The espionage case has put Rome at the centre of a new geopolitical flashpoint, and the cost of aid to Ukraine continues to be a sore point within her own coalition. Follow the money: Italy’s defence budget is under strain, and the €2 billion figure is not static. More packages may be needed, and the political math in Rome is unforgiving.
For now, Meloni appears to have the upper hand. Her leadership during the espionage crisis has been praised by Western allies, and her stance on Ukraine remains firm. But the coalition is a living organism.
The next few months will reveal whether Meloni can continue to hold the line—or whether the mechanics of coalition politics will force a recalibration. The catch is that in Italian politics, nothing is permanent.
