KYIV, July 13 — Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukraine has systematically struck Russian oil depots and energy facilities. The goal is straightforward: disrupt military logistics by cutting the fuel supply for tanks, aircraft, and other military vehicles. The campaign is not new, but it is sustained.
The pattern is clear from the timeline. An oil depot in Belgorod was hit in April 2022.
A drone attack struck Engels Air Base in December 2022. An oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai was targeted in May 2023. In January 2024, Ukraine hit a fuel depot in St. Petersburg.
The March 1, 2025 strike on Stavropol Krai continues this sequence. Open-source intelligence indicates over 20 such strikes have occurred since 2022.
The mechanics here rely on domestically produced drones. The UJ-22 Airborne, with a range up to 800 kilometers, is one of the platforms used. These are not Western-supplied long-range missiles.
Ukraine is using its own manufacturing base to reach deep into Russian territory and hit rear-echelon assets. The economic disruption is significant, according to open-source intelligence assessments. Each strike on a fuel depot or refinery creates a bottleneck in Russia’s domestic fuel supply chain.
That bottleneck then affects the military’s ability to move fuel to forward operating bases. The catch is that Russia has responded by deploying electronic warfare systems and air defenses near critical infrastructure.
This is an adaptive defense, not a static one. This is a campaign of attrition, not a single knockout blow. Ukraine is targeting the logistics tail, not the combat head.
Reducing Russia’s fuel supply for tanks, aircraft, and other military vehicles degrades combat effectiveness over time. It forces the Russian military to either divert resources to protect fuel infrastructure or accept reduced operational tempo.
Both options carry costs. What to watch next is whether Ukraine can sustain the pace of these strikes as Russia adapts its electronic warfare and air defense coverage. The drone range of 800 kilometers limits the target set, but that still covers a significant portion of western Russia’s energy infrastructure.
If Ukraine can continue to hit new depots faster than Russia can harden them, the economic disruption will compound. If Russian defenses improve faster than Ukrainian drone production, the campaign will stall. That is the dynamic to track.
