Germany has committed to spending 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. The pledge came after the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, and it is one of the clearest signs of how far Berlin has moved from the restraint that defined its foreign policy for seven decades, according to an essay from Carleton University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.
The essay traces that shift from the Federal Republic’s founding in 1949. West Germany built its identity as a Zivilmacht, or civilian power, resting on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation and economic diplomacy. Konrad Adenauer tied the country to the West, and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik favoured trade and dialogue over force. After reunification in 1990, Germany still held back from deploying its military, and NATO allies mocked the approach as “chequebook diplomacy.”
Scholz and the gap between words and action
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 broke that pattern. Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende, a turning point, and promised a €100 billion special fund for defence.
Delivery lagged. Bureaucratic bottlenecks, coalition disputes and a lingering culture of pacifism slowed the work. Scholz refused to supply “offensive” weapons, Taurus missiles above all, and doubts grew about whether Germany could actually raise defence spending. The essay says this inconsistency cost him trust at home and abroad. His coalition collapsed in late 2024 over fiscal disputes about the debt brake.
Merz drops the red lines
Friedrich Merz became Chancellor in February 2025 and promised a “Zeitenwende 2.0.” His government’s stance on Ukraine is support with “no ifs or buts,” in contrast to what the essay calls Scholz’s “two steps forward and one step back” approach. Merz lifted range restrictions on German-supplied weapons, so Ukraine can hit military targets inside Russia. Military aid to Kyiv is separate from domestic defence spending, though its size is set in annual budget decisions.
Merz has also proposed that Ukraine become an “associate member” of the EU. Ukraine would attend high-level meetings as an observer without a vote while it completes the legal and administrative work needed for full membership.
Money, war readiness and conscription
To pay for the build-up, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake and set up a €500 billion infrastructure and defence fund. Merz wants the Bundeswehr to become “the most powerful conventional army in Europe.”
The “Operational Plan for Germany,” known as OPLAN, makes the country the central logistics hub for NATO in Europe. In a large-scale conflict with Russia, Germany would serve as the transit corridor and operational base for allied troops.
Manpower is the most divisive issue. In late 2025 the government passed the Military Service Modernization Act, which aims for 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. Volunteers with financial incentives come first. If targets are missed, the law allows a “needs-based service duty” to be activated. Conscription was abolished in 2011, and the essay reports significant civil unrest over the prospect of its return, with younger Germans seeing a step back toward militarism.
Nuclear questions
Merz has ruled out buying a nuclear arsenal, but his government is pursuing what the essay calls an “Atomic Zeitenwende.” Germany has deepened ties with France and the United Kingdom through the E3, a forum set up in 2003 to coordinate diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program. Through the Kensington Treaty, and alongside Franco-British cooperation under the Northwood Declaration, Berlin is seeking to tie European security more closely to the two countries’ deterrents. The shift is driven partly by President Trump’s “America First” strategy.
The essay concludes that Germany is not returning to aggressive militarism. It describes a “defensive and integrated Machtpolitik,” pursued through NATO and EU institutions and aimed at denying Russia victory rather than redrawing borders.
