BRISTOL, September 15 — Ten years after the UK voted to leave the European Union, the economic verdict is coming into focus, and the numbers are not kind. According to analysis by BBC Economics Editor Faisal Islam, the damage is now measurable — though the mechanics of how you measure it remain fiercely contested. The UK formally left the EU in 2020.
The trade deal Boris Johnson’s government agreed that December guaranteed zero tariffs on exports to the bloc. Zero tariffs, though, is not the same as zero friction.
Businesses report non-tariff barriers — red tape, paperwork, delays — that have created costs and, just as damagingly, an expectation of hassle among prospective customers.
The Eskimo case
Consider Eskimo, a Bristol firm selling high-fashion, energy-efficient electric radiators built on technology developed by academics in the city. Its boss, Phil Ward, says the start-up has kept growing — but could have grown far more without what he calls “the Long Brexit effect.” In 2020, 40% of Eskimo’s exports went to the EU. By 2025, that figure was just 5%.
The company did manage to export some goods to agents in France, but stopped selling directly to European consumers entirely. A planned expansion into Germany floundered.
When Eskimo looked elsewhere — exporting towel rails to Australia and New Zealand — it found no particular advantage, because both countries abide by international safety standards. The catch is that the EU was never just another market; it was the adjacent one.
What the trade data shows
Eskimo’s experience reflects a broader trend. The UK Trade Policy Observatory at Sussex University calculated a rapid 26% reduction in the different types of UK exports by 2023. A new study from Aston University Business School, using five years of more detailed trade data, concludes a loss of 53.8% of the type of exports and 31.5% for imports.
These figures for “trade varieties” represent falls in the number of products sent to different EU countries. Official figures show that compared to 2019, 2025 UK exports to the EU were 14% down and imports were down 10%.
Last year, 2025, was the worst year for UK goods export volumes to the EU this century, apart from one year in the depths of the financial crisis. Think tank Niesr calculates exports were 16.9% lower and imports 16.1% less than what could have been expected based on positive pre-2016 trends. The Centre for European Reform also uses data to assess the impact.
A decade ago, many economists argued the UK would sustain longer-term economic damage by leaving the EU, and many believe that damage has come to pass. But assessing this requires comparing what happened with what might otherwise have happened — a matter of method and statistical judgement.
The counterfactual problem
The period since Brexit has been one of huge global flux: the pandemic that struck in the spring of 2020, the war in Ukraine that began two years later, and more recently the energy price shock sparked by the conflict in Iran. Economists making the calculations say they have factored in the global turmoil. Others question their methods and the extent of Brexit’s impact.
Some of the most negative predictions back in 2016, including those that said the UK could experience a Great Depression-style hit, proved unduly pessimistic. Whatever economic hit there was, it was not sudden enough to cause an instant recession.
Nick Bloom, a British Stanford University professor and author of one of the most prominent recent major studies using Bank of England data, is blunt about where the profession stands. “Among economists there is not much debate, but there still is among policy folks,” he says. “The experts were right.
It was, if anything, worse than we thought, but it’s taken longer to get there.” What to watch next is whether the trade-variety losses documented by Aston and Sussex translate into pressure for regulatory alignment with Brussels — or whether Westminster accepts a smaller export base as the price of divergence.
