MANAMA, July 10 — China imported about 60% of its crude oil from the region in 2022, a figure that underscores the strategic weight of the Strait of Hormuz for Beijing’s energy security. That transit corridor, a narrow chokepoint between the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, remains the critical artery for global crude flows. The United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, coordinates the primary security architecture in these waters.
The strait is governed under international law as a transit passage under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as UNCLOS. Iran, which controls the northern coastline of the waterway, has not ratified that treaty.
This legal gap forms a persistent source of tension. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, responsible for asymmetric warfare tactics, operates from the Iranian side and has historically used small fast-attack craft and mine-laying capabilities to challenge naval traffic.
Operation Sentinel and the security architecture
In response to escalating threats to commercial shipping, the United States established the International Maritime Security Construct in 2019. This coalition, branded Operation Sentinel, includes the United Kingdom, Australia, and other allied nations. The Fifth Fleet serves as the operational hub for these patrols.
The Gulf Cooperation Council states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Oman, border the strait directly and participate in the broader security framework. Saudi Arabia and Iraq depend on the waterway for oil exports, as do Kuwait and Qatar.
China and India rank as the largest consumers of crude transiting the strait. Japan and South Korea are also significant importers. For Beijing, the arithmetic is straightforward.
Any sustained disruption in the strait would directly affect refinery input and fuel pricing across the Chinese economy. The 2022 import figure — about 60% of crude from the region — provides a baseline for understanding the supply-chain exposure.
Iran’s position and the legal framework
Iran’s non-ratification of UNCLOS creates a recurring point of friction. While the treaty recognizes the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, Tehran has at times asserted restrictive interpretations of its territorial waters. The IRGC Navy’s doctrine of asymmetric warfare is designed to offset the conventional naval superiority of the Fifth Fleet and its partners.
This dynamic has produced periodic confrontations, including the seizure of commercial vessels and harassment of naval assets. The Gulf Cooperation Council states face a dual challenge.
They rely on the strait for their own hydrocarbon exports, yet their security posture depends heavily on the U.S.-led naval presence. Oman, which borders the strait’s southern approach, has historically maintained diplomatic channels with Iran while cooperating with the IMSC framework. The UAE operates major port and logistics infrastructure that supports both commercial shipping and coalition naval operations.
Saudi Arabia and Iraq, both major exporters, have limited alternative routes for crude shipments. Saudi Arabia operates the East-West Pipeline, which bypasses the strait, but its capacity does not fully replace the waterborne route.
Iraq, whose southern oil terminals load directly into the Persian Gulf, has no practical alternative. Kuwait and Qatar face similar constraints.
Supply-chain implications for Asian consumers
The concentration of risk in the strait creates a structural vulnerability for Asian economies. China, India, Japan, and South Korea collectively account for a substantial share of global crude imports, and the strait is the only maritime route connecting the Persian Gulf producing region to the Indian Ocean and beyond. For Chinese refineries, particularly those on the eastern coast, the crude supply chain depends on uninterrupted passage through this chokepoint.
Figures from 2022, the most recent year for which comprehensive data is available, show that China imported about 60% of its crude oil from the region. That dependency has driven Beijing to diversify supply sources, including increased purchases from Russia and West Africa, and to maintain strategic petroleum reserves.
However, the cost and logistical complexity of rerouting supply chains around the strait remain prohibitive for sustained periods. The Fifth Fleet’s mandate includes not only direct naval patrols but also coordination with commercial shipping operators and insurance markets. The IMSC provides a framework for shared situational awareness, allowing merchant vessels to transit with a higher degree of security.
The coalition’s presence also serves as a deterrent against Iranian harassment campaigns, though it cannot eliminate the risk entirely. Looking ahead, the key variable remains Iran’s willingness to abide by international norms of transit passage.
The IRGC Navy’s asymmetric capabilities mean that even a localized incident — a mine strike, a fast-boat swarm, or a vessel seizure — could trigger a broader disruption. The Fifth Fleet and its partners will continue to patrol, but the underlying legal and political tensions show no signs of resolution. For China and other Asian importers, the arithmetic of energy security in the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to change anytime soon.
