BRUSSELS, Sept. 8 — The US-Israeli war on Iran has forced the European Union to confront a strategic dilemma in the Gulf, reconfiguring how Brussels views a region it once treated mainly as an energy supplier, according to new analysis from Kozminski University. Against this backdrop, the EU’s response to the conflict is best characterised as selective engagement, argues the analysis by a professor of economics and international relations at the Warsaw-based university.
The bloc is seeking to limit its exposure to regional instability while preserving strategic interests in the Gulf — a balancing act that reflects the broader challenge of maintaining global relevance while depending on politically volatile regions. Europe’s energy dependence has been the central driver of this recalibration.
Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine initiated a gradual reduction in EU imports of Russian energy between 2022 and 2026, underscoring the need to diversify suppliers. While the United States and Norway emerged as major partners in that effort, Gulf states also became increasingly important alternative sources as European countries compensated for reduced Russian flows. The war in Iran has exposed a new vulnerability within that strategy.
Disruptions to Gulf energy supplies, together with volatility in global markets, demonstrate the risks of Europe’s growing reliance on a region marked by persistent geopolitical instability. Before the war on Ukraine, Russia was the EU’s largest supplier of crude oil, accounting for 16.5% of EU oil imports, followed by the United States at 8.2%, Norway at 7.5%, Iraq at 4.5% and Libya at 3.7%.
In 2019, Russia was also the EU’s largest supplier of natural gas. Russia’s use of energy as a tool of political pressure in 2021, followed by the outbreak of war in 2022, prompted the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas as rapidly as possible.
In May 2022, the European Commission introduced the REPowerEU Plan, calling for an end to dependence on Russian energy through savings, accelerated renewable deployment and supply diversification. ### Divergent paths The analysis contrasts the broader EU approach with Poland’s distinct calculations, highlighting how Warsaw’s focus on immediate security, its export-driven economy and a lack of state-led economic diplomacy have limited its engagement with the Gulf. Central and Eastern European countries, sharing a common communist history, were particularly dependent on Russian energy.
Slovakia was among the most dependent, with Russian oil accounting for almost 80% of its oil imports. By contrast, Western and Southern European countries recorded dependence levels below 5%.
Poland’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy have led to closer energy ties with individual Gulf states. Saudi Arabia has become an important source of crude oil, while Qatar has emerged as a key partner in natural gas supply.
Poland thus provides a concrete example of how the broader European shift away from Russian energy has translated into greater reliance on Gulf suppliers — and, consequently, greater exposure to instability affecting the region. ### What to watch Looking ahead, the analysis projects that these dynamics will influence cooperation across energy, security, diplomacy, trade and investment. It suggests the EU is moving toward a more pragmatic and multifaceted partnership with the Gulf states.
Poland, however, risks missing key opportunities if it fails to develop a coherent strategy for closer cooperation. At the same time, the analysis notes, focusing on the EU and US markets — which absorb about three-quarters of Polish exports — may be a rational use of limited diplomatic opportunities in a frontline state. The question now is whether Warsaw can balance that focus with a more deliberate Gulf strategy as the region’s strategic importance continues to grow.
