When Russia’s full invasion began on February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s navy had almost nothing left to fight with. Moscow’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 had stripped it of most of its ships, and analysts cited in a new paper from the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies describe the country as all but defenseless at sea.
The Black Sea mattered a great deal to the Kremlin’s plan. The paper, published in June 2026, lists three jobs for the Russian navy: add strike power to the south-eastern axis, shield Crimea’s exposed supply lines from Ukrainian air attack, and blockade Ukrainian ports. Ukraine leans heavily on exports of sunflower seeds and grain, so a blockade threatened its income directly.
Cheap boats instead of warships
Kyiv could not build a fleet to match. It built uncrewed surface vehicles instead, and used them to push the Russian navy away from the Ukrainian coast.
The first attempts were rough. Sevastopol, the key Russian port, came under attack in late 2022, with sea drones among the weapons used, but the damage was limited. Aerial drones and missiles still looked like the bigger threat. Later models kept running into the same faults: unreliable hardware, dropped connections and Russian countermeasures.
Ukrainian engineers kept changing the design. The “Sea Baby” and the TLK 150 series followed, according to the paper. Hybrid electric-diesel engines gave them longer range while still allowing attack speeds of up to 40 knots. Better sonar and visual navigation improved positioning, and the automatic targeting systems held up better against Russian jamming and electronic warfare.
The boats also stayed cheap. They were assembled from “off-the-shelf products,” so they needed no complicated supply chain or maintenance setup and no specialized crew to field them.
The authors say the payoff was clear. Ukrainian sea drones pushed the Russian navy off the Ukrainian coast and back toward the Russian mainland, and they disrupted Russian efforts to blockade the country.
The lesson drawn for Taiwan
The paper’s real subject is Taiwan. Its authors argue that Taipei should fold uncrewed surface vehicles into what they call a “layered denial strategy,” combining surveillance, strike and denial tools. The aim would be to limit the freedom of movement of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy, make a blockade harder to enforce, raise the cost of an amphibious landing and buy time for allied help to arrive.
They sketch three ways Beijing might act: a direct invasion, a limited maritime quarantine enforced by the Chinese Coast Guard, or a full naval blockade. The Atlantic Council has called a blockade “China’s most viable option,” the paper notes, citing a 2023 strategy paper by Jestrab.
The authors concede that the Black Sea and the Taiwan Strait are different places. Even so, they conclude that maritime drones could become a significant part of Taiwan’s deterrence.
