On 2 July 2025, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a law suspending access for International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors until the “security” of the country’s nuclear facilities is guaranteed. DW reported that the order came with no timetable and few details. It followed US and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June.
That decision set the course for what the agency now describes as a near-total loss of monitoring.
A suspension, not a break
Experts had feared worse, DW noted, including a full end to cooperation or a walkout from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran has used limits on inspections as a pressure tactic before. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said talks with Washington would not restart quickly, but added that “the doors of diplomacy will never slam shut.” Israel’s foreign minister, Gideon Saar, condemned the move and urged the European parties to the 2015 deal to trigger the snapback clause, which would reinstate UN sanctions.
The agency had already been refused entry to the bombed sites. A report in late May 2025 had put Iran’s stock of 60% enriched uranium at over 400 kilograms and criticized a “lack of cooperation.”
A deal that did not last
On 9 September 2025, the IAEA and Iran signed the Cairo Agreement, an understanding on procedures for inspections at all declared facilities. Iran terminated it on 20 November 2025, according to a June 2026 analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security, which summarizes the agency’s latest quarterly reports.
In a letter dated 29 January 2026, the agency warned that without more cooperation it could not conclude that no declared nuclear material had been diverted. Iran answered on 2 February that normal implementation of safeguards was “legally untenable and materially impracticable.” After 28 February 2026 the IAEA stopped verification work in Iran under its safeguards agreement, the report says.
What the agency can and cannot see
The IAEA’s report of 4 June 2026 says it cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran’s enriched uranium. Before the June 2025 strikes, inspectors had verified 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, 184.1 kilograms up to 20 percent, 6024.4 kilograms up to 5 percent and 2391.1 kilograms up to 2 percent.
Iran has denied access to 20 declared nuclear sites and one other location, the analysis says. The exception is oversight of refueling at the Bushehr power plant, where the agency carried out an inspection from 1 to 3 June 2026. To fill the gap, the IAEA is leaning on commercial satellite imagery and other reporting. In its own words, the lack of access to verify the previously declared stockpile is “a matter of proliferation concern.”
The report also names the tunnel complex at Isfahan as a storage site for uranium enriched to 20 and 60 percent. In February 2026 the agency saw regular vehicle activity at its entrance. Director General Rafael Grossi has said most of the highly enriched uranium, though less than 70 percent of the stock, is believed to sit inside it.
Iran has long said its nuclear work is peaceful.
Sources
- Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring and NPT Safeguards Reports — June 2026 | ISIS Reports | Institute For Science And International Security
- Iran orders suspension of cooperation with UN nuclear agency
