KYIV, July 13 — The shift is unmistakable. Ukraine has built a domestic drone industry from scratch, turning low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles into a strategic weapon for long-range strikes deep inside Russia. It’s a direct workaround for a critical gap: the lack of Western-supplied long-range missiles.
The numbers tell part of the story. As of 2024, Ukraine produces over 100,000 drones annually, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. That industrial base is now operational, with platforms like the UJ-22 Airborne and the AQ-400 Scythe leading the charge. The UJ-22 Airborne, built by Ukrjet, has a range of 800 kilometers and can carry a payload of 20 kilograms. The AQ-400 Scythe, a kamikaze drone from Ukroboronprom, reaches 750 kilometers. These are not experimental prototypes—they are mass-produced weapons.
How the drones work
The technology is straightforward but effective. These drones rely on GPS guidance to navigate, and they fly at low altitudes to evade radar detection. That low-altitude flight path makes them hard to intercept, especially for Russia’s air defense systems designed to track higher-flying targets. The drones are also small and relatively cheap, which allows Ukraine to use them in large numbers.
Russia has deployed electronic warfare systems to counter the drones. Jamming signals, spoofing GPS coordinates, and even physical interception are all part of Moscow’s playbook. But Ukraine continues to adapt its tactics, adjusting flight routes, altitudes, and timing to stay ahead of the countermeasures. This cat-and-mouse game is central to the conflict’s technological dimension.
Recent strikes and strategic impact
The April 27, 2024 strikes on oil depots in Stavropol Krai and Moscow Oblast offer a clear example of this capability in action. Those targets are over 500 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory, making them unreachable for most Western-supplied systems. But the UJ-22 Airborne and AQ-400 Scythe can cover that distance easily. Ukrainian officials have not officially confirmed the drones used in those strikes, but the range and payload match the specifications of these domestically produced platforms.
The strikes hit critical infrastructure—oil depots that fuel Russia’s military logistics. By targeting these deep inside Russian territory, Ukraine is forcing Moscow to spread its air defenses thinner, protecting oil facilities and other strategic assets far from the front lines. That’s a significant tactical shift.
The industry behind the drones
Ukraine’s drone industry is not a single company effort. It involves multiple firms, including Ukrjet and Ukroboronprom, both state-linked enterprises that have ramped up production rapidly. The 100,000-plus annual figure from Defense Minister Reznikov underscores how serious the government is about scaling this capability. That production rate, if sustained, gives Ukraine a steady supply of long-range strike capacity without waiting for Western approvals or deliveries.
The economics matter too. A kamikaze drone like the AQ-400 Scythe costs a fraction of a cruise missile. That means Ukraine can afford to use them in large numbers, saturating Russian defenses and increasing the likelihood of successful strikes. It’s a classic asymmetric strategy: cheaper technology, used cleverly, to offset a more powerful adversary’s advantages.
What’s next
Watch this space. The trend underneath is clear: Ukraine is not just building drones; it is building a new kind of air force. One that operates at low altitudes, in large numbers, and with a focus on deep strikes. As electronic warfare evolves and both sides adapt, the next generation of drones will likely feature improved counter-jamming, longer ranges, and even larger payloads.
For now, the UJ-22 Airborne and AQ-400 Scythe are the workhorses. But the industrial base that produced them is already thinking ahead. The shift is toward a future where drones, not missiles, define the long-range strike landscape. Ukraine is betting big on that future—and the results are already visible on the ground.
