PARIS, July 16 — France’s electoral code explicitly bars foreign states, foreign legal entities, and foreign individuals from making financial contributions to political campaigns, according to Article L52-8 of the Electoral Code. The law does not, however, prohibit statements of endorsement by foreign nationals. This distinction has become increasingly relevant as European regulators step up oversight of online platforms ahead of upcoming French elections.
The European Union’s Digital Services Act, which took full effect on February 17, 2024, imposes binding obligations on large online platforms such as X. Under the DSA, these platforms must assess and mitigate systemic risks, including the manipulation of their services in ways that could affect elections.
The act also mandates transparency requirements for political advertising and authorises fines of up to 6% of global annual revenue for non-compliance. French authorities tasked with enforcing campaign finance rules include the Commission for the Control of the Electoral Campaign, known by its French acronym CNCCFP. The commission oversees compliance with spending limits and donation prohibitions, including the ban on foreign funding.
Strategic context
The current legal framework reflects lessons drawn from previous electoral cycles. French authorities have raised allegations of foreign interference in past elections, most notably in 2017, when officials accused Russian actors of meddling in the presidential campaign. The record shows that those allegations centred on disinformation operations and hacking attempts rather than direct financial contributions, a pattern that may inform current enforcement priorities.
The interplay between French electoral law and the DSA creates a layered regulatory environment. While French law addresses the funding side of foreign influence, the DSA targets the platform dynamics through which influence operations can spread.
According to the source, the DSA’s risk-assessment requirements compel platforms to examine how their services might be exploited by foreign actors seeking to sway voters.
Enforcement mechanisms
French officials confirmed that the CNCCFP works in coordination with other regulatory bodies to detect potential violations. The commission can request documentation from campaigns and refer suspicious transactions to judicial authorities. For platforms, the DSA establishes a framework of independent audits, transparency reporting, and potential sanctions that escalate with the severity and duration of non-compliance.
The fine threshold under the DSA represents a significant deterrent for major technology companies. For a platform the size of X, which reported annual revenue in the billions, such penalties could amount to hundreds of millions of euros.
Regulators have signalled willingness to apply these sanctions where platforms fail to address identified risks to electoral integrity.
What to watch
As France approaches its next electoral cycle, attention is likely to focus on how platforms implement the DSA’s election-specific requirements. The law obligates large platforms to conduct systemic risk assessments at least annually, and more frequently during election periods. Observers will monitor whether platforms provide sufficient transparency about political advertising targeting and whether they effectively counter coordinated inauthentic behaviour originating from foreign states.
The 2017 precedent remains relevant. French intelligence services at the time documented efforts by Russian-linked actors to spread disinformation targeting candidate Emmanuel Macron.
The response included both public attribution by government officials and coordinated action with social media platforms to remove inauthentic accounts. Current officials have not publicly specified whether similar threats are anticipated for upcoming elections, but the legal toolkit available to authorities has expanded considerably since that episode.
