BEIJING, July 18 — China’s first official Arctic policy white paper, published in January 2018, declared the country a “near-Arctic state” — a self-designation that drew criticism from Arctic governments and analysts. The document remains Beijing’s most detailed regional strategy statement to date. The white paper argues that China’s geographic proximity, climatic vulnerability, and economic interests give it a stake in Arctic affairs.
It outlines four principles — respect, cooperation, win–win outcomes, sustainability — and focuses on climate change, ecological protection, shipping routes, and resource utilization. The document commits to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The White Paper Framework
China’s Arctic interests are pursued through the “Polar Silk Road,” a component of the broader Belt and Road Initiative. According to the white paper’s logic, this route is intended to bypass the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal via the Northeast Passage. Analysts have also noted development of People’s Liberation Army capabilities that could extend to the Arctic.
Strategic objectives are grouped into four areas. Scientific research includes an active polar program, icebreakers, and research stations.
Natural resources cover oil, gas, and minerals, including partnerships with Russia on the Yamal LNG project. Shipping routes focus on melting sea ice and the Polar Silk Road. Strategic presence emphasizes peaceful use, but dual-use concerns remain among analysts.
Deepening Scientific Engagement
China’s links to the Arctic date to 1925, when the Republic of China signed the Spitsbergen Treaty granting commercial access to Svalbard. Scientific engagement grew from the late 1980s with the establishment of the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai and the launch of the Chinese Journal of Polar Research in 1988. The first Chinese scientist-led expedition to the North Pole occurred in 1995, followed by the first Polar Research Institute of China expedition in 1999.
China has conducted annual Arctic expeditions since 2016. It joined the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996 and has operated research icebreakers — the Xue Long since 1999, and the Xue Long 2 since 2018.
In 2004, China established the Yellow River Station on Norway’s Svalbard archipelago, officially devoted to research but with dual-use concerns raised by analysts. China hosted the Arctic Science Summit Week in 2005 — the first Asian country to do so.
Strategic and Resource Ambitions
By 2010, Chinese policymakers pursued a cautious approach to avoid alarming Arctic coastal states. In 2012, the Xue Long became the first Chinese vessel to traverse the Northeast Passage. China was granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013.
In September 2015, Chinese navy vessels appeared near the coast of Alaska for the first time. In 2018, the Xue Long 2 traversed the Northern Sea Route.
Looking ahead, the pace of China’s Arctic engagement is likely to accelerate. The combination of established research infrastructure, expanding icebreaker capacity under the Xue Long program, and the strategic logic of the Polar Silk Road suggests continued investment. The question for Arctic coastal states — and for analysts tracking dual-use capabilities — will be how Beijing balances its stated commitment to peaceful use with the operational reach it continues to develop.
