“Sleep well, European partners.” That was how Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and a former president, ended a post on social media about two lists the Russian Defense Ministry published on the evening of April 15.
The lists name companies and addresses across Europe that Moscow says are making strike drones and components for Ukraine. One, titled “Branches of Ukrainian Companies in Europe,” names 11 enterprises in countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic. The other, “Foreign Enterprises Producing Components,” covers 10 companies in Germany, Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Turkey and Israel. Addresses in London, Munich, Prague, Riga, Madrid and Venice appear.
The ministry said it was informing European citizens about “the true causes of threats to their security.” It described joint drone production with Ukraine as “a step towards escalation” that risks pulling European countries into direct confrontation with Russia.
Medvedev’s reading
Medvedev told readers to take the ministry statement “extremely literally.” In his words, publishing the production sites “is a register of potential legitimate targets for the Russian armed forces.” He added: “When strikes become a reality depends on what comes next.”
The Greek City Times, which reported the story, called the remarks one of the most direct public threats a senior Russian official has made against European industry that supports Ukraine.
European reaction
The Czech Republic, which had facilities on the list, summoned the Russian ambassador and demanded an explanation. Other EU governments called the move intimidation and hybrid warfare meant to split Europe and discourage military-industrial help for Kyiv.
The timing matters to both sides. Ukraine has stepped up long-range drone strikes on Russian territory, and European countries are taking on more commitments to co-produce weapons with Ukraine to cover supply shortages. Moscow has long said such cooperation makes Europe a party to the war rather than a supporter.
Analysts see a familiar pattern of Russian “red line” signaling, with public lists and threats meant to deter. Past warnings have not always been followed by action against NATO territory. No sign of planned strikes has emerged. Still, the war is heading into its fourth year, and European supply chains are more deeply involved than before.
