“Russian EW was a no-show.” That was Bryan Clark’s verdict in IEEE Spectrum on 30 Jul 2022, five months into the invasion. Ukrainian troops had captured a Krasukha-4 jamming system near Kyiv in March, and the Hudson Institute fellow treated it as the symbol of a capability that failed when it mattered. Then it came back.
Why it stalled, and why it recovered
Around Kyiv, Clark wrote, Russian columns crawled along ground routes because they lacked air superiority, and “ground operations can only move as fast as their fuel supply.” Civilian cellular traffic in the dense urban areas drowned out military transmitters, so Russian systems “were unable to pinpoint” them. NATO-supplied SINCGARS radios, which encrypt traffic and hop among frequencies up to 100 times a second, made detection harder still.
The war then settled into attrition along stable lines in the south and east. Clark said at least three of Russia’s five EW brigades were engaged in Ukraine by then and were locating Ukrainian positions from their radio emissions. His caution: “winning the airwaves does not equal winning the war.”
The systems
Army Recognition, in an analysis dated May 31, 2024, lists three that matter most for guided munitions. The R-330Zh Zhitel jams GPS signals across 100 MHz to 2 GHz and puts out strong jamming within a 30 km radius. The Krasukha-4 goes after X-band and Ku-band radars. The Tirada-2 is built to jam satellite communications.
Clark’s account splits the work differently: Leer-3 systems use Orlan-10 drones to spot Ukrainian artillery, Krasukha-4 jams radars on drones such as the Bayraktar TB2, and the Zhitel disables GPS on smaller drones and on communications gear.
The effect on Western weapons was measurable. Ukrainian soldiers told reporters that Russian forces can jam satellite-guided Excalibur artillery shells, and Army Recognition reports that a senior US official said the Pentagon expected some precision-guided weapons to be defeated by Russian electronic warfare. HIMARS destroyed command stations and warehouses in its first year of use; in the second, according to the same analysis, Russian jamming began to degrade it. U.S. and Ukrainian crews had to keep updating software and tactics to cope.
Jamming does more than blunt shells. The analysis says Russian EW also intercepts Ukrainian communications to learn about troop movements, and works against reconnaissance and targeting drones.
Scale, and Ukraine’s answer
Writing in The Cipher Brief on August 18, 2026, retired Major General Matthew Van Wagenen put the density at “a major electronic warfare system approximately every 10 kilometers along the front line during peak operations.” In his account the Krasukha-4 hunted airborne surveillance platforms and satellites, the Murmansk-BN disrupted communications over wide areas, and the Zhitel and Pole-21 jammed GPS-guided rounds. Drone suppression gear cut command links on 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz.
Ukraine adapted by treating software as the weapon. Van Wagenen says its forces “pioneered a ‘DevOps’ warfighting philosophy,” placing EW operators inside combat units. His warning to NATO is blunt: without software that can be updated “under fire,” future forces risk going in “blind, deaf, and disconnected.”
Sources
- The Fall and Rise of Russian Electronic Warfare
- Analysis: Which Russian Electronic Warfare Systems Jam US Excalibur & HIMARS Ammunition in Ukraine
- The Return of the Essential Art: Electronic Warfare and the Lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War





