RIYADH, July 26 — The Houthi movement has built a substantial arsenal of drones and missiles since 2015, relying on technology supplied by Iran, according to assessments from international monitors and weapons experts. The arsenal includes the Quds-1 cruise missile, with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, and the Samad-3 drone, a modified version of the Iranian Ababil-3. The Houthis also operate the Burkan-2H ballistic missile, a variant of the Iranian Qiam-1, and the Zelzal-2 artillery rocket.
In 2019, the movement introduced the Qasef-1 and Qasef-2 drones, which analysts believe were reverse-engineered from Iranian examples. The September 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack marked a turning point.
A coordinated wave of low-flying cruise missiles and armed drones evaded Saudi air defenses, including the U.S.-supplied Patriot missile systems. The attack struck critical oil infrastructure, temporarily cutting global production. Since then, the Houthis have continued to target Saudi airports, oil facilities, and military bases with the same weaponry.
The United Nations Panel of Experts has confirmed that missile and drone components used by the Houthis are of Iranian origin, a finding that violates U.N. arms embargoes.
Low-cost systems, high-value targets
The record shows that these attacks have demonstrated the growing effectiveness of low-cost drones against high-value targets, challenging traditional air defense paradigms. The Houthis use drones not only for strikes but also for surveillance, and for attacks on ships in the Red Sea. The Samad-3 drone, for instance, can loiter for extended periods, providing persistent reconnaissance.
The Quds-1 cruise missile flies at low altitude, making it difficult to detect by radar systems designed to track ballistic threats. The Houthis have also used the Zelzal-2 artillery rocket, though it is a shorter-range system, often employed against forward positions.
Each of these systems shares a common thread: they are relatively inexpensive compared to the sophisticated interceptors they are meant to defeat. The Patriot batteries that failed to stop the Abqaiq–Khurais attack cost millions per missile. The Quds-1 cruise missile, by contrast, is a fraction of that cost.
The source material provides no specific price. The Saudi-led coalition has responded by investing in counter-drone systems such as the C-RAM and jamming technologies.
These systems are designed to track and destroy small, slow-moving drones or disrupt their communications. But the threat persists. The Houthis have adapted by varying their launch patterns, using decoys, and flying drones at low altitudes where radar coverage is sparse.
Implications for air defense
The evolving nature of Houthi drone warfare has broader implications for military planners worldwide. The attacks in Yemen represent one of the first sustained uses of armed drones by a non-state actor against conventional military forces and critical infrastructure. The Abqaiq–Khurais attack alone showed that even advanced U.S.-supplied air defenses can be saturated by a mass of low-flying, slow-moving threats.
The record shows that the Houthis have since refined their tactics, integrating surveillance drones to scout targets before strike drones are launched. In the Red Sea, Houthi drone attacks on shipping have introduced a new layer of risk for maritime commerce.
The source material notes that the Houthis have used drones for attacks on ships in the Red Sea. The international community has responded with naval patrols and sanctions, but the low cost and relative ease of production make the drone threat difficult to eliminate completely. The U.N. Panel of Experts has repeatedly cited Iranian origin for the Houthis’ missile and drone components, a clear violation of U.N. arms embargoes.
The panel’s reports have traced specific parts, including guidance systems and propellant, back to Iranian suppliers. The Houthis have denied receiving direct support from Iran, but the evidence compiled by independent monitors continues to accumulate.
What to watch next
With the Houthis expanding their drone inventory and refining their tactics, the Saudi-led coalition faces an ongoing challenge. Counter-drone systems like C-RAM and jamming can mitigate some threats, but they are not foolproof. The Houthis have shown a capacity to learn and adapt, shifting their targeting priorities and launch methods.
As the conflict in Yemen continues past its tenth year, the drone and missile arsenal assembled by the Houthis remains one of the most potent asymmetric capabilities in the region. International monitors will likely continue to document Iranian component flows, and the world’s militaries will watch closely to see how the lessons of Abqaiq–Khurais reshape air defense thinking.
