KYIV, July 13 — The shift in how Ukraine prosecutes its long-range war is no longer just about the weapons supplied by Washington or London. It is increasingly about what Kyiv builds itself, and who is directing those strikes. The Main Directorate of Intelligence, known as the HUR and led by General Kyrylo Budanov, has become the central nervous system for planning and executing attacks deep inside Russian territory.
Budanov, born in 1986, has been a fixture of Ukrainian military operations since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. His agency now oversees a strike strategy that targets Russian military infrastructure far from the front lines.
The HUR’s portfolio includes attacks on oil depots, ammunition depots, and airfields.
Domestic Drones, Global Reach
The hardware for these missions increasingly comes from Ukraine’s own defense industry. Drone manufacturer Ukrjet, founded in 2015, produces the UJ-22 Airborne drone. Another key player is Ukroboronprom, the state-owned defense conglomerate, which manufactures the AQ-400 Scythe.
On April 27, 2024, strikes hit Stavropol Krai and Moscow Oblast — regions well inside Russia. The reach of those attacks demonstrated that Ukraine’s domestic capabilities have matured beyond defensive systems.
The HUR is the operational hand behind such missions, selecting targets and coordinating the launches. Western partners, including the United States and the United Kingdom, provide technical assistance and funding to support these programs. But there is a critical constraint: Washington and London restrict the use of their own weapons for strikes inside Russia.
That restriction creates a gap that Ukraine’s indigenous drone industry is now filling.
The Architecture of a Strike
The HUR does not simply buy drones off a shelf and fire them. The agency integrates intelligence, targeting data, and logistics into a coherent campaign. Budanov’s team identifies vulnerabilities in Russian air defense coverage, maps supply routes, and prioritizes targets that will have the greatest operational impact.
Oil depots are a recurring target. Hitting them disrupts fuel supplies for Russian armored columns and aviation.
Ammunition depots, when struck, can produce secondary explosions that destroy weeks of stored munitions. Airfields are harder to hit but offer high returns — damaging runways or parked aircraft forces Russia to redeploy assets, stretching its already strained logistics. The April 27, 2024 strikes on Stavropol Krai and Moscow Oblast were not symbolic.
They signaled that the HUR can reach the capital region and the southern military districts simultaneously. That geographic spread complicates Russian defensive planning.
What to Watch Next
The trend underneath this is clear: Ukraine is building a long-range strike capability that operates independently of Western weapons restrictions. The HUR, with Budanov at the helm, is the institution driving that evolution. As Ukrainian drone production scales up — Ukrjet and Ukroboronprom are both expanding output — the frequency and range of these strikes will likely increase.
Watch this space. The HUR’s campaign is not a one-off.
It is a structural shift in how Ukraine fights a war where the front line is no longer a fixed line on a map. The next target could be any military asset within range, and the range is growing.
