KYIV, July 7 — The Security Service of Ukraine has been a key actor in planning and executing long-range drone strikes on Russian territory since 2023, a role that marks a significant evolution for the agency founded in 1991 as the nation’s main intelligence and security agency. The mechanics here are worth dissecting: this is not a sporadic effort but a deliberate, institutionalised program with its own dedicated drone unit, domestic production lines, and a stated economic-warfare objective.
The SBU’s claims of responsibility for multiple drone attacks on Russian oil refineries in 2024 lay bare the strategic logic. The August 26, 2024, strike on the Omsk refinery stands as a concrete example.
SBU officials have stated that these operations aim to “reduce the economic potential of the aggressor country” and “limit the supply of fuel to Russian troops.” On closer reading, this is a campaign targeting the financial and logistical arteries that sustain military operations, not merely a symbolic show of reach. The agency operates its own drone unit, a dedicated force equipped with domestically produced platforms including the Liutyi (Fury) and the UJ-22 Airborne.
That these are Ukrainian-made systems, not imported hardware, points to a deliberate industrial strategy — a domestic supply chain that reduces dependency on foreign partners for the weapons themselves, even if funding and support come from elsewhere.
The expansion under Malyuk
The expansion of drone operations has been overseen by SBU head Vasyl Malyuk, appointed in 2023. His tenure has coincided with a significant expansion of drone operations. The agency has also been involved in strikes on Russian military airfields, ammunition depots, and command centers — a widening of the target set that suggests an evolving doctrine, not a fixed playbook.
The catch is that the full picture remains opaque. The SBU’s drone program is funded by the Ukrainian government and supported by international partners, but details remain classified.
That opacity makes it difficult to assess the scale of the operation, the volume of drones produced, or the exact nature of foreign involvement. Follow the money, and you hit a wall of official secrecy.
The economic logic of the campaign
The targeting of oil refineries is not random. Refineries are high-value, stationary assets that are difficult to defend and expensive to repair. A single successful strike can disrupt fuel supply chains for weeks or months.
The SBU’s stated aim of limiting fuel supply to Russian troops connects directly to battlefield logistics: less fuel means less mobility, less air support, less ability to sustain offensive operations. The mechanism is straightforward, even if the execution requires sophisticated planning and precise intelligence.
The SBU’s role in strikes on military airfields and ammunition depots suggests a parallel effort to degrade Russian combat power directly, not just its economic base. Command centers, too, have been targeted — a move that strikes at the nervous system of military decision-making. These are not indiscriminate attacks but calibrated strikes on specific nodes of the Russian war machine.
What to watch next
The trajectory of the SBU’s drone campaign will depend on several factors: the continued availability of funding, the resilience of domestic production, and the ability to adapt to Russian countermeasures. The classified nature of the program means that public reporting will likely lag behind operational reality. But the pattern is clear: the SBU has made long-range drone strikes a central pillar of its strategy, and there is no indication that this approach is being reconsidered.
The question now is whether the agency can sustain the tempo of operations and expand the range of targets, or whether Russian air defenses and electronic warfare will force a recalibration. The answer will emerge not in official statements but in the smoke rising from the next refinery or ammunition depot.
