NEW DELHI, November 14, 2026 — India has decided to let the 30-year Ganges Water Sharing Treaty with Bangladesh expire in December, a move designed to leverage New Delhi’s position as the upper riparian state in upcoming renegotiations. While the government intends to maintain current water flows as a gesture of goodwill, the strategic calculus behind the expiry centres on securing additional water for domestic infrastructure and addressing long-standing grievances from Indian border states.
The Mechanics of the Expiry
The treaty, signed on 12 December 1996 by Indian Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed, established a framework for sharing the waters of the Ganges at the Farakka Barrage during the dry season. Under the current agreement, both nations receive 35,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs) of water alternately for 10-day periods between March 11 and May 11. This formula was intended to replace decades of conflict with a predictable allocation system, recognising Bangladesh’s rights as the lower riparian state while managing India’s upstream needs.
According to officials aware of the matter, the Centre plans to allow the pact to lapse when its 30-year term concludes next month, but will continue water sharing under the existing terms for the time being. This interim arrangement is explicitly described as a diplomatic tool to enhance bilateral relations while India seeks to renegotiate the terms. The strategic implication is clear: by letting the treaty expire rather than renewing it, India retains the leverage to demand changes before any new legal framework is established. The salient point is that the expiry is not a withdrawal from cooperation, but a reset of the negotiating table.
Domestic Pressures and Water Requirements
The decision is driven largely by internal political and developmental pressures. Officials from the West Bengal and Bihar governments have long argued that the current treaty harms their states’ water interests. These state-level complaints have been a persistent feature of the treaty’s politics, with border states often feeling that national agreements compromise their local agricultural and industrial needs.
India states it requires an additional 5,000 cusecs of water, bringing its total requirement to 40,000 cusecs, to support specific developmental initiatives. These include flushing sediments to maintain operations at Kolkata’s Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port, meeting water requirements for NTPC thermal power plants, and curbing salinity intrusion in the Sundarbans and adjoining agricultural areas. The Central Water Commission presented these technical details to the Ministry of External Affairs last month, with officials from West Bengal and Bihar in attendance. One official noted, “We need at least 5,000 cusecs extra water to flush out sediments at Kolkata Port in the lean season and also to stop saline intrusion in Sundarban deltas and adjoining agricultural suitable areas.”
This demand highlights the tension between national diplomatic commitments and sub-national resource needs. For all the noise about bilateral relations, the internal pressure from states like West Bengal and Bihar is a significant factor in New Delhi’s willingness to risk diplomatic friction. The additional water is not merely a political ask; it is tied to concrete infrastructure and environmental management goals that the central government is accountable for delivering.
Bangladesh’s Political Backlash
In Dhaka, the treaty’s expiry has become a focal point for political opposition. Members of Parliament from Jamaat-e-Islami, the principal opposition party, have submitted proposals seeking parliamentary debates on the issue, citing national water security concerns. Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem, a Jamaat lawmaker from Dhaka-14, specifically sought a discussion to review the situation and consider measures to protect Bangladesh’s interests. The opposition is pressing the government to clarify its stance and the extent to which national interests are being safeguarded in ongoing behind-the-scenes discussions.
While the government maintains that discussions are continuing, the political landscape in Bangladesh is complicated by broader mistrust of India. The opposition is using the treaty issue to hold the government to account on matters of national interest, alongside other contentious topics such as the Matarbari Deep Sea Port project and labour unrest in the ready-made garment sector. This domestic pressure makes it difficult for Dhaka to appear weak or overly accommodating in any new negotiations, even if the government privately seeks a resolution.
Strategic Leverage and Regional Implications
The expiry of the treaty is seen as a test of practical cooperation between two countries with divergent political systems and growing mistrust. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has been vocal in asserting that the lower riparian state has a duty to respect the upper riparian state’s faith in treaties made in good faith. This rhetoric underscores the power dynamic inherent in transboundary water management, where the upstream state holds significant leverage over the downstream state.
Failure to reach a new agreement could exacerbate existing political distrust and affect broader bilateral issues, including trade, border security, and regional projects. The Ganges is not an isolated issue; it is part of a complex web of 54 transboundary rivers flowing from India into Bangladesh. The outcome of these negotiations will have ramifications far beyond the allocation of river water, potentially influencing the trajectory of Indo-Bangladeshi relations in an era of shifting geopolitical alignments.
Notably, India has also set up a panel to examine the restoration and future management of the Teesta Barrage Project in West Bengal, a move that coincides with growing Chinese involvement in Bangladesh’s plans for the Teesta river. This adds another layer of strategic complexity, as water diplomacy is increasingly intertwined with broader regional competition. The salient point is that the Ganges treaty is no longer just about water; it is a proxy for broader geopolitical and economic interests.
What Comes Next
As the expiry date approaches, the focus shifts to whether technical cooperation can be transformed into a politically workable agreement. India’s Ministry of External Affairs told Parliament in February 2026 that talks on renewal had not begun, although representations from stakeholders, particularly West Bengal, had been received. Bangladesh publicly sought a new deal with stronger guarantees in September 2026, while India stated that technical talks were ongoing but renewal negotiations had not started.
The next scheduled date for potential action is the treaty’s expiry on 12 December 2026. Until then, both countries will continue to operate under the existing framework, with India maintaining the same volume of water allocation. The outcome of these negotiations will determine whether the Ganges remains a source of cooperation or a flashpoint for tension. For now, the ball is in New Delhi’s court, with Dhaka watching closely for signs of flexibility or further hardening of India’s position.
Sources
- Delhi corners Dhaka with water diplomacy as India plans to let Ganga treaty expire
- Ganges water dispute
- As the Ganges Treaty Approaches Expiry, Can India and Bangladesh Separate Water Security From Political Distrust? – The Wire
- Opposition seeks debates on Ganges treaty, RMG unrest
- From Ganges Treaty to Matarbari: Issues Jamaat seeks to raise in Parliament
Photo: Debmalyap (CC BY-SA 4.0)
