KYIV, July 7 — The shift is becoming clearer by the week: Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign is no longer a series of ad hoc strikes but a structured, two-agency operation with direct presidential authorization. The Main Directorate of Intelligence, known as HUR, and the Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU, are the primary actors behind these deep strikes into Russian territory, and the division of labor between them tells the story of a maturing strategic capability.
Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov has led the HUR since 2020, and his agency is responsible for strategic reconnaissance and special operations. Budanov has publicly claimed responsibility for several drone attacks on Russian oil refineries, including the August 2023 strike on a refinery in Krasnodar Krai.
That public claim of responsibility is itself a shift — a signal that Kyiv is increasingly willing to own these operations, at least at the leadership level. The SBU operates under Vasyl Malyuk, who has headed the agency since 2023. Malyuk stated in November 2023 that SBU drones had struck 17 Russian oil and gas facilities.
That is a significant operational tempo, and it points to a sustained campaign rather than one-off raids. Both agencies run their own dedicated drone units: the HUR’s ‘Kryla’ (Wings) unit and the SBU’s ‘Aerorozvidka’ (Aerial Reconnaissance) unit.
The most recent major strike, on Omsk, was claimed by a Ukrainian military source speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity. That source stated it was a “special operation” by the HUR. The anonymity is standard for operational security, but the attribution to HUR specifically is consistent with the agency’s growing role in deep-strike missions.
These operations are not conducted in isolation. The HUR and SBU coordinate with the Ukrainian Air Force and the General Staff. That integration is the trend underneath the headlines — a shift from intelligence agencies acting independently to a joint operational framework that brings together reconnaissance, strike capability, and strategic planning.
The strikes are part of a broader strategy to degrade Russian logistics and fuel supplies before the 2024 summer offensive. That timeline is the key context: these are not symbolic strikes.
They are designed to affect the battlefield calculus by hitting fuel depots, refineries, and supply chains before ground operations intensify. Both the HUR and the SBU report directly to President Zelenskyy, who has authorized deep strikes as a legitimate form of self-defense. That direct reporting line is significant — it means the president has a direct hand in shaping these operations, rather than delegating them through a longer chain of command.
The Omsk strike, the Krasnodar Krai refinery attack, the 17 facilities hit by SBU drones — each is a data point in a larger pattern. The trend underneath is clear: Ukraine is building a long-range strike capability that is organized, authorized, and increasingly integrated with conventional military operations.
The drone campaign is likely to intensify, and the coordination between HUR, SBU, the Air Force, and the General Staff will be the mechanism that drives it.
