MADRID, September 10 — Spain’s government published a batch of declassified intelligence documents on Tuesday that trace a far more tangled sequence of events in Ceuta than the political argument over the Spanish enclave had allowed, revealing early warnings, Moroccan preventive measures and contradictory assessments inside Spain’s own security apparatus. The files, produced by the National Police, the Civil Guard, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) and the Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS), do not present a unified verdict on Morocco’s role.
Some move from factual observation to political hypothesis unsupported by conclusive intelligence. One intelligence report concluded that the evidence did not support any “clear dereliction of duty” by Moroccan authorities.
A warning Rabat says it saw coming
A key revelation is that Morocco had already warned Madrid about the implications of Spanish Supreme Court ruling 814/2026, which changed the procedure for people intercepted at sea while trying to reach Ceuta or Melilla by swimming. A senior Moroccan official stated that Rabat had identified the problem before the major surge. Spain’s Civil Guard had itself warned as early as July 8 of a possible “pull effect” and of constraints on its response.
Against this backdrop, the documents show that the warnings did not travel in one direction only. Morocco’s preventive measures were documented by the National Human Rights Council (CNDH), which recorded tighter surveillance in Fnideq and reinforced deployments around sensitive areas from the end of June, followed by arrests of would-be migrants and the disruption of successive collective crossing attempts during the second half of July.
As July 30 approached, the measures expanded to include interceptions and restrictions on movement toward northern Morocco.
What the Spanish records show
Spanish figures quantify the effort. Civil Guard records show 1,429 interceptions by Moroccan forces between July 20 and 26. Between 8 a.m. on July 29 and 8 a.m. on July 30, Moroccan forces intercepted 493 people out of 1,109 attempted crossings by sea.
The CNI’s urgent note C/10399 reached Morocco’s General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST) and General Directorate for Studies and Documentation (DGED) at 6:26 p.m. on July 29, only hours before the mass crossings. Earlier that day, at 1:52 p.m., the CNI had informed Spain’s Government Delegation in Ceuta of online calls for crossings by sea and over the fence, then contacted the Civil Guard.
The note was labelled an “early warning” and thanked the DGST and DGED for their “valuable and continued cooperation.” A CIFAS assessment issued at 1 p.m. on July 30 stated that the crossing attempts were a “direct consequence” of the Supreme Court ruling, which imposed a decisive limitation on Spanish security forces. It recorded that Moroccan forces had intercepted around 500 of approximately 1,100 attempts and assessed it as “very likely” that Moroccan authorities were not actively encouraging the migration wave.
The wider picture
The documents reveal a striking contradiction. While part of the Spanish debate focused on assigning responsibility to Morocco, the files trace a different sequence of early warnings, Moroccan preventive measures and divergent accounts inside Spain’s own security and intelligence apparatus. What is at stake now is how Madrid reconciles those accounts.
The published record points to a dispute that was never really about a single night in July, but about which version of the run-up to it Spain’s institutions are prepared to own.
