MOSCOW, July 9 — The shift is subtle but unmistakable. After more than four years of grinding war, the Kremlin is quietly signaling it has not exhausted its military options. If President Vladimir Putin chooses to escalate the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian military has a well-rehearsed playbook ready—and it draws heavily on tactics honed since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.
At the top of that list is an intensified campaign of long-range missile strikes. Russia has relied heavily on cruise missiles such as the Kalibr and Kh-101, along with ballistic missiles like the Iskander, to hit Ukrainian infrastructure and military targets deep behind the front lines.
These weapons have been a staple of Russian operations since the early days of the war, and a renewed salvo would follow a familiar pattern. What’s changing is the potential scale: with domestic production ramping up and fresh supplies arriving from North Korea and Iran, the Kremlin may feel it can sustain a higher tempo of launches than it could a year ago. Then there are the drones.
Since the fall of 2022, Russia has deployed Iranian-made Shahed one-way attack drones extensively. These relatively cheap, slow-flying munitions have been used to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and terrorize civilian populations, particularly during nighttime attacks.
A new escalation would almost certainly see these drones used in even larger swarms, targeting everything from power plants to residential blocks.
Manpower and ground offensives
But missiles and drones alone do not win ground. For that, Russia needs troops. On September 21, 2022, Putin announced a partial mobilization that called up around 300,000 reservists.
That move, deeply unpopular at home, provided the manpower for Russia’s grinding offensives in the Donbas through the winter of 2022-2023. Another mobilization—perhaps larger, perhaps more discreet—is a credible scenario.
Western intelligence estimates, as of early 2025, put Russian casualties (killed and wounded) at over 300,000. Those losses have been staggering, but the Kremlin has shown it is willing to absorb them. Should a new mobilization be ordered, the most likely target for a renewed ground offensive remains the Donbas region—specifically Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts—where Russian forces have fought for years to seize the remaining Ukrainian-held cities.
Southern Ukraine is another flashpoint. The Zaporizhzhia and Kherson areas could see fresh attacks.
Russia already holds significant territory there, but a push to expand its bridgehead on the west bank of the Dnipro River or to cut off Ukrainian supply lines to the south would be a major escalation. The trend underneath all this is a grim return to the winter of 2022-2023. That season, Russia targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure with systematic missile and drone barrages, causing widespread blackouts and leaving millions without heat or power in freezing temperatures.
The goal was clear: break Ukrainian morale and force Kyiv to the negotiating table by making civilian life unbearable. It did not work then, but the Kremlin may try again. Attacks on the power grid are a proven Russian tactic, and with a new winter approaching, the window for such a campaign is narrowing.
Supply lines and staying power
Russia’s ability to sustain these operations depends on more than just its own factories. The source material confirms that Moscow has increased its own defense production, but it has also actively sought munitions from North Korea and Iran. These two countries have become critical back-channel suppliers, providing artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and drones that help Russia replenish its depleted stocks.
Watch this space: any new escalation will likely be preceded by a surge in deliveries from Pyongyang and Tehran, as Russia stockpiles the material needed for a sustained campaign. The bottom line is that Russia has multiple escalation pathways open to it, each with its own risks and rewards.
A new mobilization could trigger domestic unrest. A renewed infrastructure bombing campaign could harden Western resolve to supply more advanced air defense systems to Ukraine. And a ground offensive in the south could stretch Russian logistics to the breaking point.
But the Kremlin has consistently shown it is willing to pay a high price for territorial gains. The question now is not whether Russia has the tools to escalate—it clearly does—but whether Putin decides the moment is right to use them.
For Kyiv and its Western allies, that is the trend to watch.
