BEIJING, July 10 — For all the noise surrounding nuclear posture in an increasingly tense world, China’s position remains, notably, one of the more consistent on the books. The country has maintained a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons since its first nuclear test in 1964, a stance it reaffirms regularly. That is a long run, by any measure.
It places Beijing in a distinct category among the five recognised nuclear-weapon states, most of which reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conventional conflict. China is also a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which it ratified in 1992.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has historically opposed nuclear proliferation, including in the context of North Korea and Iran. The salient point, perhaps, is that this policy has not been cost-free in diplomatic terms. China has also criticised NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, a position that has put it at odds with Western allies.
In January 2022, the five nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US—issued a joint statement affirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. That statement, at the time, was hailed as a rare moment of consensus.
A Departure on Russia
China’s reported ‘harsh’ response to Russian nuclear threats aligns with its long-standing policy of opposing nuclear use. But it marks a departure from its previous reluctance to criticise Russia directly. For years, Beijing had tended to avoid public condemnation of Moscow’s strategic posturing, preferring instead to call for restraint in general terms.
That appears to have shifted. The precise details of that response remain opaque, but the fact that it was described as ‘harsh’ suggests a genuine concern within the Chinese leadership about the trajectory of Russian nuclear rhetoric.
It would seem that even a strategic partner has its limits when the subject turns to the use of weapons of mass destruction.
The Size of the Arsenal
China’s nuclear arsenal is estimated at approximately 500 warheads as of 2024, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). That figure places it well behind the United States and Russia, which each maintain arsenals in the thousands, but ahead of the United Kingdom and France. For all the noise about Chinese nuclear modernisation, the numbers remain relatively modest by superpower standards.
Still, the trend is upward. SIPRI and other analysts have noted a steady increase in China’s warhead count over the past decade, driven by a modernisation programme that includes new delivery systems and a more diversified force structure.
Whether that trajectory continues will depend, in part, on the broader strategic environment.
What to Watch Next
The key question is whether China’s no-first-use policy will hold as the geopolitical landscape shifts. The reported friction with Russia over nuclear threats suggests that Beijing is not immune to the pressures of alliance management. At the same time, China’s criticism of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements indicates that it sees the West’s posture as a source of instability.
The joint statement from January 2022 remains the most recent high-level consensus among the nuclear powers. But with Russia’s war in Ukraine ongoing and tensions in the Indo-Pacific rising, the prospects for a repeat of that agreement look slim.
For now, China appears to be playing a careful game: reaffirming its own restraint while signalling discomfort with the nuclear brinkmanship of others.
