KYIV, July 13 — Ukraine’s long-range strike architecture is now split between two distinct chains of command, and the mechanics here are worth close attention. The Ukrainian Air Force and the Main Directorate of Intelligence, known as HUR, each hold pieces of the puzzle. The catch is that coordination between them is not always seamless, and the strategic logic behind the targeting choices is becoming clearer with each operation.
General Mykola Oleshchuk, Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, and Kyrylo Budanov, head of HUR, have publicly stated that hitting Russian energy infrastructure is a core component of Ukraine’s strategy. The stated goal: degrade Russian combat capabilities by cutting fuel supplies and disrupting logistics. On closer reading, this is not merely about battlefield tactics. It is a campaign to impose operational costs on Moscow’s war machine by striking at its industrial base.
The drone program itself has been built with outside help. International partners, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have provided assistance. But there is a constraint: the U.S. has restricted the use of its weapons for strikes inside Russia. That means the drones hitting Russian territory are almost certainly Ukrainian-made.
Ukraine now produces its own long-range drones, including the Liutyi, or Fierce, and the UJ-22 Airborne. Both have ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. That range opens up targets deep inside Russia that were previously out of reach. Follow the money: domestic production reduces dependence on foreign-supplied munitions that come with political strings attached, and it allows Kyiv to sustain a strike tempo that might otherwise be impossible.
Command and Control
The dual command structure raises questions about coordination. General Oleshchuk runs the Air Force’s long-range strike units, while Budanov oversees HUR’s separate drone operations. Both report to the same civilian leadership, but the potential for duplication or even conflicting priorities is real. The strikes are coordinated between them in practice, but the division of labor is not always clear from the outside.
What is clear is that both men have been vocal about the energy infrastructure campaign. Their public statements frame it as a methodical effort to hollow out Russia’s ability to sustain prolonged combat operations. Not just a headline grab, but a calculated economic pressure point.
What to Watch
The next phase will depend on whether Ukraine can scale up production of the Liutyi and UJ-22 faster than Russian air defenses adapt. The U.S. restriction on strikes inside Russia is not likely to change soon, which means Kyiv will continue to rely on its own industrial base. The question is whether that base can keep up with the operational tempo that Oleshchuk and Budanov are setting.
