MUSCAT, July 11 — For decades, when the United States and Iran have needed to talk without the world watching, they have turned to quiet intermediaries and secret channels. These backchannel communications, as they are known in diplomatic circles, represent one of the most persistent — and paradoxical — tools in the fraught relationship between Washington and Tehran. The practice is not new.
Backchannels between the two adversaries have existed since the 1980s, when the Iran-Contra affair unfolded between 1985 and 1986. In that episode, the United States secretly sold arms to Iran in an effort to secure the release of American hostages.
It was a clandestine operation that would later explode into a major political scandal, but it established a pattern: when official diplomacy stalls, unofficial pathways open.
Oman’s quiet role
The Sultanate of Oman has emerged as perhaps the most consistent venue for these secret talks. In 2013, backchannels were used to arrange a secret meeting between U.S. and Iranian officials in Muscat, the Omani capital. That meeting led directly to the interim nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action, signed in November 2013.
The breakthrough was a surprise to much of the world, but it had been quietly prepared for months through intermediaries. Two years later, the more comprehensive 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — the JCPOA — was facilitated by further backchannel talks conducted in both Oman and Switzerland.
These negotiations involved layers of secrecy, with officials from both sides meeting away from cameras and press conferences. Switzerland, too, has long served as a protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran, and its diplomats have often acted as discreet message-carriers between the two capitals.
A channel for regret
The utility of backchannels extends beyond nuclear negotiations. In 2019, according to a Reuters report, Iranian officials used a backchannel to communicate directly with advisers to then-President Donald Trump. The message was specific: Iran expressed regret over the seizure of the Stena Impero, a British-flagged oil tanker that Iranian forces had boarded in the Strait of Hormuz that July.
The recipients of that backchannel communication included John Bolton, who was then the U.S. national security adviser, and Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state. Both were known for their hawkish views on Iran.
That the Iranian government chose to convey regret through a secret channel rather than a public statement underscored the value of deniability — a core feature of backchannel diplomacy.
How backchannels work
Backchannels are a recognized tool in diplomacy, prized for the flexibility they offer. They allow governments to test proposals without the political cost of a public failure. They provide deniability — if a trial balloon is shot down, no one has to admit it was ever launched.
And they can move faster than official channels, which are often burdened by protocol and bureaucracy. Intermediaries are crucial.
Oman, Switzerland, and Qatar have each played this role at different moments. These countries maintain diplomatic relations with both the United States and Iran, and their officials are trusted to carry sensitive messages accurately and discreetly. In Muscat, the Omani government has historically hosted secret talks in the capital, providing a neutral ground where adversaries can sit in the same room without the glare of publicity.
A persistent pattern
What is striking about the Iran-U.S. backchannel is its durability. From the arms deals of the 1980s to the nuclear talks of the 2010s to the tanker diplomacy of 2019, the pattern repeats: public hostility, private communication. The adversaries do not trust each other enough to negotiate openly, but they trust intermediaries enough to talk.
