KYIV, July 14 — The mechanics of Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign against Russian energy infrastructure have shifted from tactical nuisance to a systematic pressure valve on Moscow’s war finances. Since early 2024, Kyiv has steadily escalated strikes on oil refineries, fuel depots, and petrochemical plants, aiming to squeeze two revenue streams at once: export earnings from oil and the military’s on-base fuel supply. The most ambitious operation to date landed on January 29, 2025.
Ukrainian drones struck the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat petrochemical plant in Bashkortostan and the Ryazan refinery southeast of Moscow. The Salavat plant sits roughly 1,500 km from Ukrainian territory — the deepest penetration of the campaign so far.
That distance matters. It signals that Ukraine’s domestically produced drone fleet, including models like the AQ-400 Scythe and the UJ-22 Airborne, now operates at ranges exceeding 1,000 km. The catch for Moscow is that defending a target 1,500 km away forces a very different air-defense calculus than protecting frontline supply depots.
The strategic logic is straightforward. Russia’s oil-export revenue funds a large portion of its war budget.
Refined fuel keeps its tanks and trucks moving. By hitting refineries, Ukraine aims to degrade both the financial engine and the tactical logistics in a single strike package. The January 29 attack on the Ryazan refinery, for instance, targets a facility that supplies fuel to the Moscow region and military units operating in central and western Russia.
The Salavat plant produces petrochemicals used in industrial supply chains that feed the defense sector. But the campaign has not been limited to headline-grabbing deep strikes. Earlier hits established the pattern: the Tuapse refinery in January 2024, the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in March 2024, and the Slavyansk refinery in April 2024.
Each strike forced Russia to divert resources. Air-defense systems that could protect front-line troops are being redeployed to guard fixed industrial sites hundreds of kilometers behind the lines.
The cost of repairing cracked distillation columns and burned-out storage tanks adds another layer of expense to a war budget already straining under sanctions. None of this would be possible without Ukraine’s indigenous drone production. The AQ-400 Scythe and the UJ-22 Airborne are not imported wonder weapons; they are designed and built inside Ukraine, with ranges that allow them to bypass Russia’s outer defensive rings.
The Salavat strike demonstrated that Ukraine can now reach targets in the Volga region and the Urals — areas previously considered safe from direct attack. On closer reading of the operational timeline, the progression is clear: from coastal refineries in early 2024 to deep inland petrochemical complexes by early 2025.
The broader consequence is a compounding cost problem for the Kremlin. Every refinery hit means lost production, lost export revenue, and a repair bill that grows with each strike. Russia must also decide how to allocate finite air-defense systems across a vast territory.
Protecting every refinery, depot, and plant from the Baltic to the Urals is prohibitively expensive. Leaving them exposed invites further disruption. What to watch next: whether Ukraine sustains the tempo of deep strikes through the remainder of 2026, and whether Russia adapts by dispersing fuel storage or accelerating repair cycles.
The campaign’s effectiveness will ultimately be measured not in drone counts but in refinery downtime and export volumes. The financial data, when it emerges, will tell the real story.
