KYIV, July 11 — Ukraine has established a dedicated long-range strike command, a development confirmed by officials and drawing on a lineage that stretches back to Soviet military theory. The new command adapts the concept of “deep operation,” a doctrine developed in the 1930s by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, to the realities of modern drone and missile warfare. The historical record shows that Tukhachevsky’s doctrine emphasized simultaneous strikes across the entire depth of an enemy’s defenses, targeting logistics and command centers.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained Long-Range Aviation (DA) as a separate branch, equipped with strategic bombers such as the Tu-95 and Tu-160. Ukraine inherited some of these capabilities after its independence in 1991, but gave up its nuclear weapons and long-range bombers under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
Adapting a Soviet Doctrine
The new Ukrainian command represents a clear adaptation of this deep-strike theory. According to the available information, the focus has shifted from the mass bombardment envisioned in the original Soviet doctrine to precision strikes using modern technology. The command’s structure is reportedly modeled in part on the US Air Force’s Global Strike Command, which was established in 2009 and oversees long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
This move reflects lessons drawn directly from the war between 2022 and 2025. The record shows that Ukraine’s use of HIMARS systems, which have a range of 80 km, and ATACMS missiles proved effective in disrupting Russian supply lines.
The new command is an effort to institutionalize and expand upon that asymmetric capability.
Strategic Context and Asymmetric Warfare
Ukraine’s decision to form a dedicated long-range command underscores a strategic shift. Rather than seeking to match Russia in traditional force-on-force engagements, Kyiv is building a capability designed to strike at depth. The deep operation theory, originally a Soviet concept, is now being employed by a former Soviet republic against Russia itself.
The command’s focus on drones and missiles, rather than manned bombers, marks a clear departure from the Cold War model. It signals an intent to develop a modern, asymmetric long-range capability that can threaten targets far behind the front lines without the need for a large air force.
Officials have not specified which systems the new command will operate, but the historical context points to a continuation of the precision-strike approach that proved effective in the recent conflict. What remains to be seen is how this new command will integrate with Ukraine’s existing military structure and how it will be resourced. The establishment of the command is a clear statement of intent, but its ultimate impact will depend on the systems and munitions it is able to field.
