WASHINGTON, July 12 — The figure that matters: $7 billion. That is the value of Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA assets frozen by the United States in January 2019, the single largest financial blow in a sanctions campaign that has now entered its ninth year. By the numbers, the US has sanctioned more than 150 Venezuelan officials and entities since 2017, when Executive Order 13692 first targeted individuals linked to corruption and human rights abuses.
The European Union has imposed its own measures, sanctioning 55 individuals and entities since 2017. The bottom line: two parallel sanctions regimes now constrain the Maduro government, though their effectiveness remains an open question for investors and policymakers alike.
The PDVSA freeze and sectoral sanctions
The January 2019 sanctions on PDVSA marked a turning point. The US froze $7 billion in assets and blocked transactions with the state oil giant, which had long been Venezuela’s primary revenue engine. In 2020, the US expanded the campaign to target the gold and oil sectors directly, cutting off additional streams of hard currency.
Investors will note that these sectoral sanctions were not absolute. In November 2022, the US issued a license to Chevron, allowing the American oil major to resume limited operations in Venezuela.
That move came as part of a broader easing of sanctions in 2022, intended to encourage negotiations between the Maduro government and the opposition.
The shift to State Department control
On March 25, 2025, the Trump administration transferred authority over Venezuela sanctions from the Treasury Department to the State Department. This gave Secretary of State Marco Rubio unprecedented powers, including control over all licenses and waivers. The reorganization effectively placed the sanctions regime under direct political management rather than the technocratic oversight of Treasury.
The practical implications are significant. Any future license, including Chevron’s, now requires State Department approval.
The shift concentrates decision-making power in one office, a structure that could accelerate or stall policy changes depending on diplomatic priorities.
Failed talks and the current impasse
Negotiations between the Venezuelan government and opposition have not yielded a breakthrough. Talks in Mexico City in 2023 failed to produce a deal. The US had eased some sanctions in 2022 to create conditions for dialogue, but the collapse of those talks left the sanctions architecture in place without a clear off-ramp.
The figure that matters now: the combination of US and EU sanctions continues to constrain Venezuela’s access to international markets, oil revenue, and gold exports. With the State Department now holding sole authority over licenses, the next move depends on Secretary Rubio’s assessment of political progress in Caracas.
What to watch: whether the Trump administration uses its consolidated sanctions authority to tighten pressure further or to offer new waivers as a negotiating tool. Investors and energy markets will be watching for any signal from the State Department on the future of the Chevron license, now the most visible exception to an otherwise comprehensive sanctions regime.
