MOSCOW, August 14 — The shift is unmistakable: Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, and its foreign intelligence counterpart, the SVR, are executing a coordinated, multi-year campaign to destabilize NATO and the European Union, according to a New York Times investigation published in June 2025. What’s changing is the scale and brazen integration of cyber warfare, disinformation, and covert political influence—all allegedly directed from the top. The GRU, long associated with high-profile cyberattacks and disinformation, has been tied to operations targeting European elections, including the 2017 French presidential race.
Hackers linked to the agency leaked emails from Emmanuel Macron’s campaign, a tactic designed to disrupt and undermine democratic processes. But the ambition doesn’t stop at elections.
Unit 29155: From Salisbury to Europe’s Doorstep
One GRU unit stands out. Unit 29155, previously implicated in the 2018 Salisbury poisonings in the UK, has expanded its reach across Europe. Western intelligence officials, speaking anonymously to The New York Times, describe its operations as ranging from assassination attempts to cyber espionage.
The unit’s activities underscore a pattern: the GRU is not merely gathering intelligence but actively shaping events on the ground. Meanwhile, the SVR has taken a more subtle but equally corrosive approach.
The agency is accused of cultivating relationships with European political figures and funneling support to extremist groups, all with the goal of deepening divisions within the EU and NATO. The strategy isn’t new, but the coordination is.
A Disinformation Ecosystem
State-backed media outlets like RT and Sputnik play a critical role in amplifying these efforts. The New York Times report highlights how these platforms have been used to push narratives critical of NATO and the EU, reinforcing the work of the GRU and SVR. The 2020 EU report cited in the investigation identified Russia as a primary source of disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, illustrating the breadth of the campaign.
What’s particularly striking is the timing. The report notes that these coordinated efforts intensified after 2022, with a clear focus: undermining support for Ukraine among NATO members.
The war in Ukraine has become a catalyst, accelerating a trend that was already in motion.
The Mechanism of Influence
The GRU’s cyber operations and the SVR’s political maneuvering are not isolated tactics. They are part of a broader, integrated strategy. Disinformation campaigns, hacking, and the cultivation of political alliances are all tools in the same toolbox, wielded in tandem to achieve a singular objective: weakening Western cohesion.
Watch this space. The trend underneath is clear—Russia’s intelligence apparatus is not just reacting to geopolitical shifts but actively engineering them.
And as the campaign evolves, so too will the methods. The question now is how NATO and the EU will respond to a threat that is as fluid as it is relentless.
