KYIV, July 7 — Against the backdrop of a war now in its fifth year, Ukraine’s unmanned aerial vehicle programme has evolved from a patchwork of improvised solutions into a sophisticated industrial enterprise, one that is reshaping the strategic calculus of the conflict. The numbers tell part of the story. Ukrainian officials have stated that domestic production of long-range drones increased by 100% in 2024 compared to the previous year, with a stated goal of manufacturing thousands of these systems annually.
This expansion is not merely about quantity; it represents a deliberate pivot toward a new kind of warfare, one in which the skies above Russian territory are no longer safe. What is at stake is the ability to strike deep into the Russian hinterland, targeting infrastructure that has, until recently, been considered beyond reach.
The UJ-22 Airborne, produced by the Ukrainian firm Ukrjet, has a range of up to 1,600 kilometres and can carry a 20-kilogram payload. The Liutyi, or Fury, drone, developed by the state-owned concern Ukroboronprom, extends that reach to over 1,000 kilometres. These are not experimental prototypes; they are operational systems, deployed in a campaign that has made Russian oil infrastructure a priority since 2023.
Engineering Under Fire
The technological development of these drones reveals a resourceful blend of domestic innovation and foreign components. Many of these unmanned systems rely on commercial GPS modules and autopilot systems, some sourced from Western suppliers. This reliance on off-the-shelf technology is both a strength and a vulnerability, but it has allowed Ukraine to scale production at a pace that would be impossible with bespoke military-grade hardware alone.
Ukraine has also turned to its Soviet-era inheritance. Modified Tu-141 Strizh reconnaissance drones, originally designed for short-range missions during the Cold War, have been retrofitted with longer-range capabilities.
These converted systems, once considered obsolete, now serve as platforms for deep-strike operations. The wider picture of this drone campaign became starkly visible on August 26, 2024, when a strike hit the Omsk refinery, a facility located approximately 2,200 kilometres from Ukrainian territory. That distance represents a significant extension of range beyond what the standard specifications of known Ukrainian drones would suggest.
Military analysts have speculated that such missions may be achieved through fuel-efficient flight profiles, or through intermediate staging — launching from positions closer to the target than publicly acknowledged.
Inside the Corridors of Power
In the corridors of Ukraine’s defence establishment, the drone programme is no longer a sideshow. It has become a central pillar of military strategy, one that offers the ability to impose costs on Russia far from the front lines without risking Ukrainian pilots or aircraft. The campaign against oil refineries, in particular, has been a consistent priority since 2023, reflecting a strategic calculation that disrupting Russia’s energy sector can degrade its ability to sustain military operations.
The implications extend beyond the battlefield. By demonstrating the ability to strike targets more than 2,000 kilometres from its borders, Ukraine has fundamentally altered the geography of the conflict.
No longer is the war confined to the Donbas, the Black Sea coast, or the border regions. Russian cities and industrial centres that once felt insulated from direct attack now find themselves within range. For European observers, the evolution of Ukraine’s drone programme offers a glimpse of the future of conflict in the region.
The same technologies — commercial GPS, off-the-shelf autopilots, lightweight airframes — are available to any state or non-state actor with the resources to assemble them. What Ukraine has demonstrated is that with sufficient determination and ingenuity, a nation under siege can develop a long-range strike capability that challenges the assumptions of conventional military planners.
The goal of producing thousands of long-range drones per year, if realised, would represent a qualitative shift in the scale of operations. It would mean that the strikes on Russian infrastructure are not one-off demonstrations of capability, but the opening phase of a sustained campaign. What to watch next is whether Ukraine can maintain this production momentum while simultaneously defending against Russian strikes on its own defence-industrial base.
The drone factories and assembly lines that make this capability possible are themselves targets. The coming months will reveal whether the 100% increase in production recorded in 2024 can be sustained, and whether the range and payload of these systems will continue to grow. For now, the UJ-22, the Liutyi, and the modified Strizh have earned their place in the strategic arsenal.
The war, in many ways, has become a laboratory for the future of aerial warfare — and Ukraine is writing the manual.
