The conflict now consuming Sudan is not a fresh crisis but the latest chapter in a long history of instability that has plagued the nation since it gained independence in 1956. Over the past six decades, the country has endured 20 coup attempts, two civil wars, the Darfur genocide, and extended periods of military rule.
The current fighting follows that same pattern. The war pits the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces under General Hemedti. Hemedti also commands the broader Janjaweed coalition—the same Arab militias responsible for the Darfur genocide two decades ago. This continuity is central to understanding the conflict.
Hostilities erupted on April 15, 2023, when RSF units attacked government sites in Khartoum and other cities, sparking the Battle of Khartoum. The immediate cause was a breakdown in negotiations over integrating the RSF into the regular army following the 2021 coup.
That coup, which derailed Sudan’s transition to civilian rule, was carried out jointly by both sides now fighting each other. The transitional administration established afterward was meant to unify the country but instead became an arena for a power struggle between the two generals and their armed followers. Hemedti had built the RSF into a formidable, battle-hardened force with its own distinct interests.
The question of integrating these fighters into the Sudanese Army was always likely to create friction. When talks collapsed, the RSF struck first.
The fighting has since expanded beyond the capital, drawing in smaller armed groups—including former rebels from the peace process and local militias—each pursuing its own agenda. The result is a multi-front battlefield with no clear resolution in sight. This is not a civil war driven by popular uprising or ideological division.
It is a conflict between two factions of the same military government, both of whom were partners in the 2021 coup. Now they are fighting over control of the country.
The human toll is rising rapidly. Even before April 15, the region faced a severe humanitarian crisis. Now refugees are fleeing, and supplies of food and medicine are dwindling.
The conflict also threatens to destabilize neighboring countries. The deeper story is one of repetition.
The Darfur genocide was carried out by the Janjaweed. Hemedti now commands that same coalition, which is fighting for control of the capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces, which either stood by or participated in that genocide, are now battling the Janjaweed.
It is a bitter irony that no one in Khartoum has time to contemplate. The smaller armed groups add further complexity.
They are not neutral, bringing their own grievances and ambitions. Their involvement could cause the war to fragment even more. The transitional administration was supposed to prevent this outcome. It failed.
The 2021 coup was meant to bring order. It brought more fighting.
The integration of the RSF was intended to unify the military. It started a war. Sudan’s chronic instability is not a background detail.
It is the central story. Every new conflict is a variation on an old theme.
The players shift. The tactics shift. The pattern holds.
The country has never managed to build lasting peace since independence. This war is the latest proof of that failure.
